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THE IDEIA AND THE RIGHT TO AN "APPROPRIATE" 
EDUCATION 
Andrea Blau * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What is an appropriate standard of education for disabled students? 
The term appropriate has been used for over thirty years in federal 
legislation to mandate to the states the standard. However, despite 
numerous court rulings and legislative updates, the standard of an 
appropriate education remains inconsistent and uncertain. It is clear that 
the legislative standard of an appropriate education has risen over the 
years but the courts that enforce the appropriate education standard 
continue to be bound by the dated 1982 Supreme Court decision in 
Rowley. Thus, when parents attempt to litigate the appropriateness of 
their disabled child's education, the courts often hold the states to a 
lower standard of appropriate than is implied in the legislation. A clear 
definition of appropriate from an authoritative federal source is required 
to force the courts and states to apply a consistent and more stringent 
educational standard for disabled students that will lift education for 
disabled students to the level of the congressional mandate. This paper 
will discuss the contention and uncertainty caused by the lack of a clear 
definition of an appropriate education* and will address the immediate 
need for clarification of a standard that is in keeping with the higher 
requirements intended by Congress. 
J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Ph.D., Speech & Hearing Sciences, City University of 
New York. Dr. Blau has over three decades of experience in designing programs for uniquely 
challenged students and has testified at impartial hearings and federal actions across the country. Her 
current focus is on the interplay of Constitutional, Administrative, and Disability Law in shaping 
public policy. She can be reached at afb@tiac.net. 
*See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 212-18 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) ("! agree thut the 
language of the Act does not contain a substantive standard beyond requiring that the education 
offered must be 'appropriate."'). 
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[1. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AN "APPROPRIATE" EDUCATION 
The most recent congressional directive, the Individuals with 
Disability Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEIA), 1 sustains an 
ambitious legislative mission that began over thirty years ago. This 
mission, of ensuring children with disabilities equality in educational 
opportunities, has both resulted in and has been shaped by a dramatic 
change in the way society views its responsibility towards its children. 
Over the course of the past three decades, legislative intent has 
progressed from simply increasing the number of challenged children 
given physical access to the benefits of public education, to ensuring 
children with disabilities cognitive access to the challenging public 
education curriculum, as provided to all children, in preparation to live 
adult independent lives. 2 
This legislative mission began with the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA). 3 The EHA reflected a major 
commitment to providing disabled youngsters with a public school 
education. It was enacted, in part, as a societal and legislative reaction to 
the de-institutionalization of disabled children, many of whom had been 
neglected, considered uneducable, or excluded from any form of public 
education. Under the EHA, local communities were held responsible for 
educating these children, just as they were responsible for educating non-
disabled children. This was a major step forward for local communities 
because, prior to the EHA, the field of special education was still in its 
infancy and the majority of teachers were untrained in methodologies 
suitable for educating students with diverse disabilities. 4 
In addition to demonstrating an initial desire and commitment to 
provide educational opportunities to disabled youth, the EHA still 
provides the basis of educational legislation today in two of its main 
features: the mandate to provide to all children with disabilities (from 
ages 3-21) a Free Appropriate Public Education (F APE) 5 within the 
Least Restrictive Environment (LRE). 6 States that successfully 
I. Individuals with Disability Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 
118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482). 
2. See 20 U.S.C. § l400(c)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000). 
3. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(1975) (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482). 
4. Brief for Nat' I Sch. Bds. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 13, Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 212-18 (1982) (No. 80-1002), 1981 WL 389687. 
5. 20 U.S.C. § l412(a)(l )(A) (2000). 
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2000). 
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implement the EHA's provisions are eligible for federal special 
education funding. 7 While the lexical term "appropriate" is not 
specifically defined in the EHA, the phrase "free appropriate public 
education" is defined and provides the foundation for states' 
accountability. 
The term 'free appropriate education' means special education and 
related services which 
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge, 
(B) meet the standards of the State Educational Agency, 
(C) includes an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
education in the State involved, and 
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education 
program [IEP] required under section 1414(a)(5) ofthis title. 8 
Although the phrases F APE and LRE would reappear in later 
legislation, the congressional intent behind the EHA evolved. 
III. THE IDEIA AND THE PROGRESSION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Over the next thirty years, the 1975 EHA mandate led to the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of 19979 and the 
IDEIA of 2004, 10 both the quality of education and the skills of 
educators advanced dramatically. Congressional intent in enacting the 
most recent legislation, the IDEIA, reflects a powerful and proactive 
mission in raising the educational standard and achievement level for 
disabled students. 11 Providing children with disabilities entry into the 
educational system is no longer the primary motivation. The evolution of 
legislative intent and the congressional commitment to providing high 
quality education to disabled students is explicitly clear within the 
IDEIA's preamble: 
Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way 
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)-(25)(2000). 
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982) (as cited in Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S 176, 188 
(1982)). 
9. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 
(1997). 
10. Individuals with Disability Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 
118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482). 
11. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(1 )(A)-(C) (West 2006). 
4 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2007 
diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute to 
society. Improving educational results for children with disabilities is 
an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent Jiving, and economic self-
sufficiency for individuals with disabilities. 1 
Thus, the IDEIA shows the substantial evolution in congressional 
intent in many of its provisions. This evolution is evidenced in many 
significant refinements in the procedural due process 13 and 
accountability measures 14 in the provision ofF APE within the LRE for 
disabled children. The IDEIA lists the items for which states are held 
accountable in order to be eligible for federal funding. 15 
In addition, the IDEIA provides very precise definitions 16 for three 
dozen lexical terms or phrases used frequently within the Act's 
provisions, such as "child with disability," 17 "core academic subjects," 18 
"highly ~ualified," 19 "individual education program, "20 "related 
services," and "special education."22 The statutory specificity of these 
definitions provides the clarity necessary for implementation criteria to 
be set. 23 Despite the effort made in the IDEIA to provide precise 
definitions to statutory language and address issues of contention 
12. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(l). 
13. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415. 
14. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414. 
15. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a). 
16. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401. 
17. 20U.S.C.A. § 1401(3). 
18. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(4). 
19. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(10) (referring to teacher qualifications). 
20. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(14). 
21. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26). 
22. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(29). 
23. For example, the term "Assistive Technology Service" is defined as: any service that 
directly assists a child with a disability in the selection, acquisition, or use of an assistive technology 
device. Such term includes-(A) the evaluation of the needs of such child, including a functional 
evaluation of the child in the child's customary environment; (B) purchasing, leasing, or otherwise 
providing for the acquisition of assistive technology devices by such child; (C) selecting, designing, 
fitting, customizing, adapting, applying, maintaining, repairing, or replacing assistive technology 
devices; (D) coordinating and using other therapies, interventions, or services with assistive 
technology devices, such as those associated with existing education and rehabilitation plans and 
programs; (E) training or technical assistance for such child, or where appropriate, the family of such 
child; and (F) training or technical assistance for professionals (including individuals providing 
education and rehabilitation services), employers, or other individuals who provide services to, 
employ, or are otherwise substantially involved in the major life functions of such child. 
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(2). 
I] THE RIGHT TO AN "APPROPRIATE" EDUCATION 5 
between parents and the state, 24 neither the IDE IA nor the DOE 
regulations define the substantive term appropriate within the phrase 
"appropriate education,"25 the very term that provides the basis of 
compliance with IDEIA. 
The IDEIA, which is far more sophisticated in both its purpose and 
protocols than the EHA, employs virtually the same definition of an 
appropriate education: 
The term 'free appropriate public education' means special education 
and related services that-
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge; 
(B) meet the standards of the State Educational Agency; 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary 
school education in the State involved; and 
(D) are provided in conformity with ~e individualized education 
program required under section 1414( d). 2 
The DOE 2005 regulations, promulgated pursuant to the IDEIA to 
interpret the Act and to direct state implementation, still do not further 
clarify the term appropriate education: 
Free appropriate public education or F APE means special education 
and related services that-
(a) Are provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge; 
(b) Meet the standards of the SEA (State Educational Agency), 
including the requirements of this part; 
(c) Include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary 
school education in the State; and 
(d) Are provided in conformity with an individualized education 
program (IEP) that meets the requirements of §§ 300.340-300.350. 
24. Paolo Annino, The Revised IDEA: Will it Help Children with Disabilities:' 29 MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. 11-14 (2005). 
25. Joshua Andrew Wolfe, Note, A Search for the Best IDEA: Balancing the Conflicting 
Provisions of the Individual With Disabilities Education Act, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1627, 1633-34 
(2002); Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187 (1982). 
26. 20 U.S.C.A. ~ 1401(9). 
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(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1401(8).)27 
Thus, neither the legislature nor its administrative agency provides 
the specific parameters with which to measure the term appropriate. 
Despite its failure to insert a definition of appropriate, Congress, in 
formulating the IDEIA, was well aware of the adversarial process that 
has steadily evolved over the past thirty years in determining whether 
disabled children are indeed receiving an appropriate education as 
mandated. The cost of litigation has been substantial, in terms of money, 
time, and energy expenditure, all of which might better be used in 
providing the needed education. One of the major refinements of the 
IDEIA is an attempt to reduce litigation by promotin~ discussion 
meetings and mediation as part of the due process protocols. 8 This more 
collaborative approach holds out the promise of greater policy balance 
and educational benefit. However, without a clear definition of the 
appropriateness feature, it is unlikely that parents and school systems 
will find common ground in defining the "educational benefit" standard. 
In addition to encouraging collaboration, other enormous 
refinements within the IDEIA including data driven accountability 
measures, 
29 higher levels of teacher qualification requirements, 30 more 
intensive parental involvement in IEP development or modification,31 
and incorporation of alternate dispute resolution methodologies, 32 have 
been put in place by the IDEIA. 
A major improvement has been made over the previous legislation 
by the merging of the accountability for Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP) found in the No Child Let Behind Act of2001 (NCLB) 33 into the 
IDEIA requirements. 34 As one of the more recent amendments to the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), the NCLB 
Act has raised the threshold of educational accountability dramatically. 35 
The Statute itself seeks "to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and 
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a 
27. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a)-(d) (2005). 
28. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)-(f). 
29. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(I)(A)(i)(IV). 
30. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(10). 
31. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414. 
32. E.g 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e). 
33. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (coditied 
as amended in scattered sections of20 U.S.C. (Supp. lll2003)) 
34. 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (Supp. Ill 2003). 
35. G. RUESCH & R.L. WATERMAN. IMPACT OF THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT ON SPECIAL 
EDUCATION IN WISCONSIN (Lorman Educ. Servs. 2005). 
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minimum, proficiency on challenging state academic achievement 
standards and state academic assessments."36 The A YP achieved by 
students receiving special education is assessed alongside their 
nondisabled peers in determining whether schools are meeting these 
mandated standards. 37 The A YP standard of the NCLB Act, which is 
well defined, has been incorporated within the newly reauthorized IDEIA 
of 2004. 38 States are now specifically accountable to provide a "high-
quality" of education to all students or they will be out of compliance 
with the ESEA. 39 
Of note, the state must establish performance goals and indicators 
that promote the purposes of the IDElA and use the same definition of 
A YP, as stated in the NCLB amendment to the ESEA. 40 By explicitly 
citing the NCLB Act within the reauthorized Act, the IDEIA mandates 
states to define A YP in a manner that applies the same high standards for 
academic achievement to all public elementary school and secondary 
school students in the state, which results in continuous and substantial 
academic improvement for all students, including students with 
disabilities. 
In this spirit and by the use of the higher educational standards of the 
NCLB, 41 the IDEIA and the corresponding DOE42 regulations provide 
increasing clarity regarding both the due process rights and educational 
standards to be met in educating disabled students. For the past year, 
most states have been reworking their own regulations to insure 
compliance with the reauthorized IDEIA and with the DOE regulations. 
While these regulations are still being promulgated, increased 
accountability measure~ articulated goals, and improved curricula 
appear to be emerging. 3 While progress within developmental goals 
36. 20 U.S.C. § 6301. 
37. 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(C)(i)-(v) ("'Adequately yearly progress' shall be defined by the 
State in a manner that-(i) applies the same high standards of academic achievement to all public 
elementary school and secondary school students in the State;. . (iii) results in continuous and 
substantial academic improvement for all students; ... (v) includes separate measurable annual 
objectives for continuous and substantial improvement for each of the following: (I) The 
achievement of all public elementary and secondary students. (ll)(cc) [achievement ofl students with 
disabilities."). 
38. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(C) (West 2006). 
39. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)-(ii). 
40. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C). 
41. 20 U.S.C. ~ 6301. 
42. 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2006). 
43. M.D. Holbrook & C. Holder. Accessing the General Curriculum: Standard-based 
Instruction (Feb. 2005), http://www.alsde.edu/html/doc_download.asp''id=2882&section=65. 
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remains an important part of a child's IEP,44 these life skills goals are 
now better balanced with educational progress within the core academic 
subjects. 45 This heightened educational standard has upgraded the 
educational expectations and requirements for all students. 
Despite the significant improvement of congressional statutes for 
education of the disabled, the conspicuous absence of one small yet 
enormously important feature-the definition of the term appropriate 
with which to measure the adequacy of the educational benefit-leaves 
the process substantially flawed 
Therefore, despite reauthorization, reenactment, and resumed 
sustained commitment to education for students with disabilities, what 
remains uncertain today is the legal definition of an appropriate 
education for disabled children that each state is mandated to freely and 
publicly provide. 
IV. THE JUDICIAL STANDARD 
The right of all citizens to an education does not appear within the 
U.S. Constitution. To a large extent, both the Brown v. Board of 
Education decision in 196546 as well as the earliest disability education 
cases, PARC47 and Mills in 1972,48 laid the foundation for the EHA of 
1975. However, these cases were based on the Fourteenth Amendment's 
equal protection and due process clauses, 49 and in the case of Mills, the 
Fifth Amendment, 50 and not on an inherent right to education. While 
there are other unenumerated Constitutional rights that are considered as 
either fundamental rights for equal protection purposes (the right to 
vote 51 or travel 52), or implied fundamental rights based on an expansive 
d . f l'b ( . 53 . s;r 55 d If rea mg o 1 erty pnvacy, marnage, autonomy, an se -
44. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(A)(l). 
45. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(C); 20 U.S.C. § 7801(11) (2000) ("[C]ore academic subjects' 
means English, reading or language arts, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and 
government, economics, arts, history, and geography."). 
46. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
47. Pa. Ass'n. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F.Supp. 279 (E. D. Pa. 1972). 
48. Mills v. Bd. of Educ. 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
49. U.S.CONST. amend. XIV,§ I. 
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
51. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). 
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,629-30 (1969). 
53. Griswold v. Conn, 381 U.S. 479,483 (1965). 
54. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,384 (1978). 
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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determination), 56 which receive a higher level of judicial scrutiny, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that education is a state responsibility 
and a not a Constitutional issue. 57 As such, the Supreme Court has shied 
away from examining cases on the basis of receipt of F APE and has 
reiterated reliance on Congress or the states to dictate educational 
1. 58 po 1cy. 
Prior to the 1982 Supreme Court decision in Rowley, 59 there was no 
single guiding judicial interpretation of the EHA. The various circuit and 
state courts that addressed the EHA varied in their interpretations. For 
example, the Eighth Circuit in 1981 60 held that a state provides an 
appropriate educa~ion to a disabled student if it offers the "opportunity 
to achieve . . . full potential commensurate with the opportunity" 
provided to other [disabled and non-disabled] children. A 1981 Alabama 
district court held that the purpose of the EHA was to provide "proper 
educational services" to handicapped children to enable them to "become 
productive citizens, contributing to society instead of beinf forced to 
remain burdens" and to increase individual independence. 6 The 1982 
Supreme Court decision in Rowley, however, reflected a more restricted 
interpretation of the educational standard and purpose employed by the 
EHA. 
The Rowley Court held that the language of the EHA, in light of its 
legislative history, was clearly grounded in providing disabled children 
with "the basic floor of opportunity" for free access to individualized 
educational instruction and supports within the least restrictive setting. 62 
In examining the educational needs of a hearing impaired student who 
had been provided with specialized instructional supports and was 
performing at above average grade level, the Rowley Court held that the 
appropriateness requirement of the Act was met. 63 The requested 
additional support, a sign language interpreter, which might allow 
Rowley to function at her maximal level was not the responsibility ofthe 
school to provide. 64 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist relied 
56. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,270 (1990). 
57. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 42-43 (1973). 
58. !d.; Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-208 (1982). 
59. Rowley, at 176. 
60. Springvale Sch. Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1981 ), vacated, 458 U.S. 1118 
(1982). 
61. Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F.Supp. 47, 54 (N.D. Ala. 1981 ). 
62. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201. 
63. !d. at 209-210. 
64. /d.at210. 
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on legislative histo~ to interpret the EHA in accordance with 
congressional intent. 6 In 1975, congressional intent reflected the dual 
priorities of insuring that disabled children were no longer excluded from 
publicly supported education and that individualized support services 
were provided to insure educational benefit from instruction. 66 
The Rowley Court noted the clear efforts in the early 1970's, to 
simply give children with disabilities an opportunity to be "served" or 
publicly educated alongside their non,:disabled peers by the provision of 
"personalized educational services." 6 ' Because the majority of children 
with disabilities were not receiving publicly supported education and the 
education provided to a few disabled children was considered 
inadequate, access to a public education for all disabled children was 
Congress' primary focus. 68 In this historical context, providing disabled 
children with a free education, with the aspiration that it would benefit 
them, was landmark in itself. 
The Court held that the school was not responsible for providing 
additional support, and noted that the EHA did not dictate the provision 
of any specific standard of educational achievement. 69 The Row!~ 
Court, citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrig,uez, 0 
deferred educational methodological considerations to the states. 1 The 
Court concluded that if a state complied with the EHA' s procedures and 
the IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits, the education was appropriate. 72 
Justice Rehnquist cautioned against over-inclusiveness in the 
application of the court's narrow holding. In speaking for the majority, 
Justice Rehnquist specifically stated: "Because in this case we are 
presented with a handicapped child who is receiving substantial 
specialized instruction and related services and who is performing above 
average in the regular classroom of a public school system, we confine 
65. !d. at 195--197. 
66. !d. at 194 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 5 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975)). 
67. !d. at 196--197 (citing S. REP. No. 94-168, at 1). 
68. !d. at 191 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2). 
69. !d. at 189 ("Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive standard 
prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children."). 
70. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 42--43 (1973). 
71. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208. 
72. !d. at 206-207 ("Therefore, a court's inquiry in suits brought under §I415(e)(2) is 
twofold. First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the 
individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits') If these requirements are met, the State has 
complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more."). 
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I . h . . ,73 our ana ys1s to t at situatiOn. 
The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari for any subsequent 
case challenging the appropriateness feature since the Rowley decision 
and neither Congress nor the DOE has supplied clarification of the term 
appropriate. Without a definition there has been and can be no 
uniformity within or across states in how the term should be interpreted 
or the quality of education states are mandated to provide. The Rowley 
Court's conclusion that an IEP created for the disabled child must 
"prov[ide] personalized instruction with sufficient support services to 
permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction~' 74 while 
leaving the methodological considerations to the states, 5 grants 
enormous deference to the State Educational Agencies (SEA) and Local 
Educational Agencies (LEA), and the IEP process but no qualitative 
legal guidelines. If bottom line educational criteria are met and no 
significant procedural due process violations arise, the quality of 
education provided to the student with disabilities has been left to the 
states to determine. 76 When faced with litigation by parents of disabled 
children seeking to challenge the educational system's provision of 
F APE, both the states and the courts have largely relied upon the Rowley 
standard as their guide. 
V. POST ROWLEY DECISIONS 
Yet despite the remarkable thirty year evolution in the legislative 
purpose as well as in the quality and scope of educational services 
provided to disabled students, the narrow interpretation of the Rowley 
standard, for example, the receipt of "some educational benefit" from a 
reasonably calculated individualized plan 77 within the least restrictive 
environment, remains the vague and inconsistently applied measure of 
educational appropriateness for disabled children. 
State, district, and circuit courts, subsequent to Rowley, have 
attempted to define "appropriate" education with little consistency or 
uniformity. The Rowley standard has been interpreted both narrowly and 
more broadly but never in the spirit of providing disabled students with 
an education commensurate with their non-disabled peers. (See Table 1.) 
73. !d. at 202. 
74. !d. at 203. 
75. !d. at 207-208. 
76. !d. at 207. 
77. !d. at 206-207. 
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Generally, a court's determination of whether a disabled student is in 
receipt of an appropriate education, assuming that mandated procedures 
have been met, is based on a continuum of interpretations of the Rowley 
standard. This continuum of decisions includes statements such as "a 
basic floor of opportunity,"78 "some educational benefit," 79 "reasonably 
calculated" to provide educational benefit, 80 not meaning "the best 
possible education," 81 not required to maximize each child's potential, 82 
not uto~ian, 83 more than trivial or de minimis progress, 84 meaningful 
benefit, 5 significant learning, 86 calculated to enable child to achieve 
passing marks and advance from grade to grade, 87 "measurable and 
adequate ~ains in classroom," 88 "gauged in relation to child's 
potential," and "specifically designed to meet ... unique needs."90 
Following the decision in Rowley, many courts have latched onto the 
"basic floor of opportunity" and "some educational benefit" lanfuage to 
restrict accountability to minimal benefit in educational goals, 9 despite 
Justice Rehn~uist's caution about confining the Court's analysis to the 
case at hand. (See Table 1.) Basing his opinion on the Supreme Court's 
78. Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994); Leonard v. McKenzie, 869 
F.2d 1558, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1989); lndep. Sch. Dist. 283 v. S.D., 948 F.Supp 860, 885 (D. Minn. 
1995). 
79. A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2004); Fayette County Bd. of Educ. v. 
M.R.D., 158 S.W.3d 195,202 (Ky. 2005). 
80. L.T. v. Warwick Sch. Cmty., 361 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004); Brown v. Bartholomew 
Con sol. Sch. Corp., No. 1 :03-CV -00939-DFHVSS, 2005 WL 552194, at *9-1 0 (S.D. Ind. Feb 04, 
2005). 
81. Kenton City Sch. Dist. v. Hunt, 384 F.3d 269, 281 (6th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, 2004 
U.S. App. LEXIS 24498 (U.S. App. 2004); E.S. v. lndep. Sch. Dist.,l35 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 
1998). 
82. Tucker v. Calloway Bd. ofEduc., 136 F.3d 495,505 (6th Cir. 1998); Ahem v. Keene, 593 
F.Supp. 902 (D. Del. 1984 ). 
83. Cone v. Randolph County Sch., 302 F. Supp.2d 500, 510 (M.D.N.C. 2004), afj"d, 103 
Fed. Appx. 731, 2004 App. LEX IS 14682 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1077 (2005). 
84. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999); Bd. of Educ. v. l.S., 
325 F. Supp.2d 565 (D. Md. 2004). 
85. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna lndep. Unit 16,853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988). 
86. Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247. 
87. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,210 (1982). 
88. Devine v. Ind. River County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1293 ( ll th Cir. 2001 ). 
89. Deal v. Hamilton, 392 F.3d 840, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, 2005 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 5631 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7325 (U.S. 2005); T.R. v. 
Kingwood Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 578 (3d Cir. 2000). 
90. Laughlin v. Cent. Bucks, No. 9!-7333, 1994 WL 8! 14, at *I (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1994). 
91. Marissa F. v. William Penn. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.04-286, 2005 WL 2304738, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 20, 2005). 
92. Rowley. 458 U.S. at 187. 
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decision in Rodriguez,93 Justice Rehnquist states that "courts lack the 
'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent 
and difficult questions of educational policy,"'94 and therefore 
"questions of methodology are for resolution by the States." 95 In a 1984 
Sixth Circuit decision, only two years after Rowley, the procedure for the 
determination of appropriateness was explained: 
The district court's decision on whether a given educational program is 
appropriate for an individual child appears to be a mixed question of 
fact and law. The trial judge is required to measure the factual situation 
of a handicapped child and the educational program proposed to 
accommodate ~~ handicap against the legal standard of 
appropnateness. 
Given the tension that now exists between the statutory provisions 
adopted by Congress within the reauthorized IDEIA of 2004 and the 
Rowley standard used by the courts, the current legal standard of 
appropriateness by which this measurement should be made remains 
unclear and a source of contention. 
Appropriate educational goals, therefore, have been left to the states 
to create, with parental input, and not for the courts to dictate. 97 Because 
courts are currently required by Rowley to give deference to the states, 
this limits the actions they take. If a court decides that an individualized 
learning plan is not appropriate, often in response to procedural due 
process violations which have negatively impacted the provision of 
F APE, 98 the court is not limited by a restricted Rowley interpretation and 
assumes authority to fashion appropriate relief. 99 But if the IEP is 
deemed appropriate, and the courts give a tfreat deal of deference to state 
educators in making this determination, 10 then the states have typically 
not been required to provide the best education, 101 an education that 
93. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 I U.S. I, 42-43 (1973). 
94. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208. 
95. !d. 
96. Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514,516 (6th Cir. 1984). 
97. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. 
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(t)(3)(E) (2000) (new provision of the reauthorized !DEJA instructs 
impartial hearing officers to base their determinations on substantive grounds rather than procedural 
grounds, unless there is a direct link between the procedural violation and the denial ofF APE). 
99. Diatta v. District of Columbia, 319 F.Supp. 2d 57, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2004); Rowley, 458 
U.S. at 210. 
I 00. Sherman v. Mamaroneck, 340 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2003); Watson v. Kingston City Sch. 
Dist., 325 F. Supp. 2d 141, 144-45 (N.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 142 Fed. Appx. 9, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15534 (U.S. App. 2005). 
101 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 187. 
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max1m1zes a disabled child's potential, 102 or even an education 
commensurate with his non-disabled peers. 103 The recent NCLB 
amendment to the ESEA stresses testing, school district accountability, 
104 
and A YP for all students. These NCLB standards have been 
incorporated into the IDEIA, which opened the door for challenging the 
"basic floor of opportunity" level of education for disabled children. Yet, 
the cases that have made their way through the state and federal courts 
still have been decided using the Rowley standard to determine the level 
of education that states must provide to students with disabilities in 
compliance with the IDEA. 105 The enactment of the IDEIA, 
incorporating the NCLB Act as an educational standard, creates a 
potentially significant conflict between the terms of the Act and the 
narrow interpretation of Rowley. 
Although the Supreme Court could revisit Rowley and offer a more 
substantive definition of "appropriateness," this is unlikely. So, despite 
more sophisticated understanding of special education issues and 
possibilities, with the Supreme Court reluctant to examine educational 
standards and in the absence of congressional clarification, lower courts 
are left with Rowley as the precedent-setting measurement standard. As 
long as the Supreme Court does not overrule Rowley or refine its 
interpretation in a subsequent decision, the meaning of the term 
appropriate remains unclear, undefined, inconsistently applied, and a 
source of frustration in educational implementation. 
VI. STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN DEFINING STANDARDS 
IDEIA implementation efforts by the states, frustrated by the lack of 
an appropriateness definition, have also compounded the problem. 
While states are responsible for the provision ofF APE within the LRE to 
secure federal funding, if states do not want to apply for federal funding, 
they are under no obligation to comply with the IDEIA. States have their 
own constitutions and statutes to which they are accountable in 
administering their education systems. 106 Each state (and the District of 
102. Leonard v. McKenzie, 869 F.2d 1558, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
103. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198-199. 
104. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C) (Supp. III 2003). 
105. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley. 458 U.S. 176,208 (1982); Kenton City Sch. Dist. v. Hunt. 384 
F.3d 269, 281 (6th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, 2004 U.S. App. LEX1S 24498 (U.S App. 2004); 
Tucker v. Calloway Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 505 (6th Cir. 1998); Reid ex re. Reid v. District of 
Columbia, 401 F.3d 516,519 (D.D.C. 2005). 
106. Burke County Bd. ofEduc. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973,983 (4th Cir.1990). 
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Columbia) has its own education laws and regulations guiding the 
implementation of those laws. 107 Given the high costs of educating 
children with disabilities, receiving federal funding is of significant 
. 108 Importance to states. 
States may also implement their own standards. If a state's 
educational standards are more stringent than those of the federal Act, 
that state is held responsible for implementing the heightened 
standard. 
109 
In examining the statutory provisions of all fifty states (plus 
the District of Columbia), with the exception of Alaska, 110 which simply 
mimics the language of the federal Act as defined in Rowley, and the 
state of Washington, 111 which provides a broad definition of an 
appropriate education, no definition for the lexical term appropriate 
appears within their constitutions, statutes, or regulations. 112 While not 
clearly defining what constitutes appropriate education, all fifty states, 
including the District of Columbia, do however have laws mandating the 
education of children with disabilities. All of the states use language 
. ·1 h A d c . 113 c . 114 1· . l t th simi ar to t e ct, many e1ernng or re1ernng exp ICit y o e 
Act. 115 Missouri, prior to the EHA of 1975, maintained a more stringent 
standard, but later amended its statute to track the language of the 
Federal Act. 116 California's statute explicitly states that it is not 
107. A.F. Blau & A.L. Allbright, 50-State Roundup: Ensuring Children with Disabilities a 
Free Appropriate Puh/ic Education, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. 1 (2006) (fifty-
state, plus District of Columbia, citations of special education law in relation to F APE). 
108. Virtually all states apply for federal funding. Correspondence from U.S. Dept. of Educ. 
(February 27, 2006) (on file with author). 
109. !d. 
110. ALASKA STAT. ~14.30.350(1) (2004) ('"[A]ppropriate education' means personalized 
instruction with sufficient support services to perrrit a child to benefit educationally from the 
instruction."). 
111. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 28A.l55.020 (West 2006) ("[A]ppropriate education is defined 
as an education directed to the unique needs, abilities, and limitations of the children with 
disabilities."). 
112. Blau & Allbright, supra note 107, at 1. 
113. E.g. CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 56000 (West 2006). 
114. E.g. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-41-101 (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT.§ 162.670 (West 2006); 
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 21-2-501 (2005). 
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(D) (2000). 
116. McEuen v. Mo. Bd. of Educ. 120 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Mo. 2003) (Court upheld 
constitutionality of state special education law changing state's maximization standard to federal 
standard for educational sufficiency. The statute was amended from a "declared policy" of the state 
"to provide ... all handicapped and severely handicapped children ... special education services 
sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities .... " to providing "a free appropriate 
education consistent with the provisions set forth in state and federal regulations implementing 
[IDEA]."). 
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responsible for providing a hi/%her level of education than mandated by 
the IDEA. 117 North Carolina 1 has enacted a more stringent statute than 
the federal Act. However, recent Fourth Circuit decisions 119 have 
weakened North Carolina's accountability to the statute by denying 
children educational programs that provided stronger educational 
services, stating that the State is not responsible for providing "utopian" 
programs, 120 relying again on the Supreme Court's holding in Rowley. 
Without a federal definition of what constitutes appropriateness, 
either within the Act or the DOE regulations promulgated to guide states 
in the enforcement of the Act, states have been free to use the minimal 
Rowley definition as a guidepost for their own statutes. Given the amount 
of funding that is at stake for the states, they have no incentive to 
maintain a higher standard. In fact, the lack of definition in legislation 
serves as a disincentive for states to pass or maintain laws with higher 
standards. 
Over the past thirty years, students and their school systems, have 
sought to determine whether the education provided by a school district 
or requested by a student complies with the EHA and its progeny, the 
IDEA and IDEIA. 121 With the passage of refined educational standards 
and accountability measures of the IDEA of 1997, litigation increased, 
reflecting parental attempts to increase the educational standards 
appropriate for their children while schools attempt to justify the 
appropriateness of the educational levels they are already providing. 122 
Litigation challenging procedural due process violations has been 
considered remediable through court decision. 123 However, when 
117. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56000 (West 2006) ("It is also the intent of the Legislature that this 
part does not set a higher standard of educating individuals with exceptional needs than that 
established by Congress under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act."). 
118. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 115C-106(a), (b) (2005) ("policy of the State is to ensure every child a 
fair and full opportunity to reach his full potential" and "to provide a free appropriate publicly 
supported education to every child with special needs."). 
119. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna lndep. Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (District 
court removed an autistic child from residential program at Benedictine School in Ridgely, 
Maryland, where child made significant progress, returning him to local school district in North 
Carolina with admittedly inferior program in accordance with his IEP; IEP held to be reasonably 
calculated to provide educational benefit). 
120. Harrell v. Wilson County Sch., 293 S.E.2d 687, 691 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (heightened 
North Carolina standard does not require that educational authorities develop "utopian educational 
program[s]" for handicapped students). 
121. See generally 20 U.S.C.S. § 1412 interpretive notes and decisions 18--45 (LexisNcxis 
2006). 
122. See generally 28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. nos. 1-6 (2004); 29 MENTAL 
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. nos. 1--6 (2005). 
123. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,210 (1982); M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 
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substantive due process issues have been the basis of an action, most 
specifically when the methodologies used to assure the receipt of an 
appropriate education are at issue, courts have been far more reticent to 
substitute their own opinions for those of state professional educators. 124 
Over the past two decades, many courts have deferred to the narrow 
Rowley standard to establish whether a child's progress was in 
compliance with the Act. (See Table 1.) Yet, there appear to be a number 
of decisions that have used a somewhat broader interpretation of the 
Rowley standard, either by examining the individual child's specific 
needs as suggested by the Rowley Court 125 or by holding schools 
accountable for a higher level of education, in line with the pre-Rowley 
d . . 126 h . b . f 127 d h d' . R l 128 Wh'l ecisiOns, t e amicus ne , an t e 1ssent m ow ey. 1 e 
precedent within a state or circuit has influenced subsequent 
decisions, 129 the body of common law that has emerged has not woven a 
clear or cohesive picture of the specific measurement standard used when 
assessing state compliance with the provision ofF APE. 130 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The explicit purpose of the reauthorized IDEIA has also gone much 
further than its predecessors. The IDEIA ensures all children with 
disabilities F APE within the LRE that emphasizes special education and 
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for 
further education, employment, and independent living. 131 State 
agencies are basing their educational curricula on the reauthorized 
IDElA and on the regulations promulgated by the DOE. There now 
exists a large chasm between the Rowley standard and the standards 
634, 642 (9th Cir. 2004 ). 
124. Rowley. 458 U.S. at 187; J.K. v. Springville-Griffith lnst., No. 02-CV-765S, 2005 WL 
711886, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. March 28, 2005). 
125. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202. 
126. !d. at 176; Sch. Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300,305 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1118 
(1982). 
I 27. Brief for Nat'] Sch. Bds. Ass'n et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 13, 
Rowley, 458 U.S. I 76 (1982) (No. 80-1002), I 981 WL 389687. 
128. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 212-18 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)("' agree that the language 
of the Act does not contain a substantive standard beyond requiring that the education offered must 
be 'appropriate."'). 
129. See San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973); Rowley, 458 U.S. 
at I 87 (I 982 ). 
I 30. See infra tbl. 1. 
131. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414 (West 2006). 
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incorporated in the Act itself. The minimal Rowley standard of providing 
the bottom floor educational opportunity, the promise of "some 
educational benefit," or the provision of some progress towards a 
reasonably calculated individual plan 132 no longer can be seen as the 
attributes of an appropriate educational plan for a child with disabilities. 
In the absence of a congressionally supplied definition of the term 
appropriate, and with no definition forthcoming from the DOE, the 
chasm will inevitably grow wider. 
The lack of a substantive definition of the appropriateness standard 
has caused substantial litigation between school systems and parents of 
children with disabilities. Even a general definition of the term 
"educational appropriateness," as education that supports a quantifiable 
measure of meaningful and adequate progress towards achieving skills to 
promote literacy, communication and self-sufficiency, might be enough, 
if stated within the IDEIA itself or within the DOE's regulations. The 
achievement of educational adequacy can no longer focus upon minimal 
educational benefit, based on a state's unguided standard of appropriate 
goals. As long as individualized special education and support services 
are provided in the LRE, the student is making some progress towards 
reasonably calculated goals, and proper procedure has been followed, 
states have been given latitude to do as little as is warranted to comply 
with the Act. Valid requests for more effective educational methods have 
been seen as "maximizing potential" 133 or providing "utopian" 
measures. 
134 Yet, methodological considerations make a substantial 
difference in the rate or even ability of a child with disabilities to learn 
what is clearlY. prerequisite to self sufficiency as currently mandated 
. h' h A 135 w1t m t e ct. 
Without a clear federal definition to support the IDEIA, a source of 
controversy, dispute, and litigation may exist for years to come. The 
DOE has had the opportunity to refine this ambiguous standard by 
incorporating a definition for the term appropriate within the guidelines 
they have promulgated for the !DEJA. Before the dust settles on the 
132. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 187. 
133. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42-43. 
134. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Indep. Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988). 
135. Marissa F. v. William Penn. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.04-286, 2005 WL 2304738, at *4 (E. D. 
Pa. Sept. 20, 2005). See also Deal v. Hamilton, 392 F.3d 840, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that in 
assessing differences in methodologies, while states, as noted by the Rowley ruling, are not required 
to maximize each child's potential, "at some point this facile answer becomes insufficient. . 
[T]here is a point at which the difference in outcomes between the two methods can be so great that 
provision of the lesser program could amount to denial of FAPE."). 
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enactment of the DOE's regulations for this very comprehensive and 
well-crafted Act, it would be wise for this administrative body to insure 
the inclusion of this long absent definition. States have been awaiting the 
finalization of the DOE regulations to ensure that their own standards are 
in compliance with the !DEJA. The pressures of the moment make it all 
the more important for the DOE or some other authoritative federal 
source to resolve this open question. 
TABLE I: COURTS APPLICATION OF ROWLEY STANDARD 
.... .... 
<:II (.J ·s 
-




1J) Q 0 
Ahem v. Keene, 593 States not required to provide best 
F.Supp. 902 (D. Del. X education money can buy nor one 
which maximizes handicapped child's 1984). potential. 
Polk v. Cent. 
Susquehanna Indep. 




1988) ( cert. denied 
1989). 
Leonard v. 
McKenzie, 869 F.2d Some educational benefits (not 
1558, 1561 (D.C. X maximizing potential); basic floor of 
Cir. 1989). opportunity. 
"Appropriate education" does not 
Union Sch. Dist. v. mean best or potential maximizing 
Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, X education; basic floor of opportunity 
1524(9thCir.l994). through individually designed 
educational benefit to child. 
Laughlin v. Cent. Specifically designed to meet unique 
needs supported by services to permit 
Bucks, No. 91-7333, benefit. 
1994 WL 8114 at* I X IEP must be reasonably calculated to (E.D.Pa. Jan. 12, 
receive educational benefit, more than 1994). trivial or deminimus progress. 
Independent School 
IDEA does not require educational 
benefits to maximize potential but 
District 283 v. SD 
merely offers basic floor of 
948 F. Sup 860 (D. X 
opportunity to progress within his 
Minn. 1995). 
education. 
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..... ..... 
Q.l C.l ..... ..... 




00 ..... ..... Q u 
E.S. v. Indep. Sch. IDEA does not require best possible Dist.,l35 F.3d 566, X 
569 (8th Cir. 1998). education. 
School's placement upheld if 
Tucker v. Calloway reasonably calculated to provide 
Bd. ofEduc., 136 
X 
educational benefits; appropriate 
F.3d 495, 505 (6th public education does not mean 
Cir. 1998). absolutely best or potential 
maximizing. 
Ridgewood Bd. of IEP must provide more than trivial 
educational benefit for educational Educ. v. N.E., 172 
X appropriateness; significant learning F.3d 238, 247 (3d 
Cir. 1999). and meaningful benefit are required to 
meet higher standard of the IDEA. 
T.R. v. Kingwood Meaningful educational benefit must Bd. of Educ., 205 
F.3d 572, 578 (3d X be gauged in relation to child's 
Cir. 2000). potential. 
Devine v. Indiana 
River County Sch. Appropriate education means that 
Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, X child is making measurable and 
1293 (11th Cir. adequate gains in classroom. 
2001). 
McEuen v. Mo. Bd. Constitutional for State to reduce 
ofEduc. 120 S.W.3d X "maximization standard" policy to 
207,209 (Mo. 2003) less stringent Federal standard for 
educational sufficiency. 
IEP held if reasonably calculated to 
A.B.v.Lawson,354 provide some educational benefit. 
F.3d315,319(4th X Local schools deserve latitude in 
Cir. 2004). determining lEPs most appropriate for 
a disabled child. 
Cone v. Randolph 
County Sch., 302 F. 
Supp.2d 500,510 NC State policy "to ensure every child (M.D.N.C. 2004), 
a fair and full opportunity to reach full 
aff'd, 103 Fed. Appx. aff potential" but not "utopian 731, 2004 App. X 
LEXIS 14682 (4th educational program for handicapped 
Cir. 2004), cert. students." 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 
1077 (2005). 
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,.... ,.... 
~ <:J .... .... 
= 
,.... 
'"' Cases ec ,.... <:J Interpretation of Standard ,.... 
"' '"' 1JJ. .... 
.... 
~ u 
Not required to provide what is best 
LT. v. Warwick Sch. for a special needs child; "reasonably 
Cmty., 361 F.3d 80, X calculated" to provide an 
83 (1st Cir. 2004). "appropriate" education as defined in 
federal and state law. 
Watson v. Kingston 
City Sch. Dist. 325 
F. Supp. 2d 141, Methodological considerations must 144-45 (N.D.N.Y. 
aff be left to state and local schools -2004), aff'd, 142 X deference due; not for Federal courts Fed. Appx. 9; 2005 
to judge. U.S. App. LEXIS 
15534 (U.S. App. 
2005). 
Bd. ofEduc. V. I.S., Did not provide F APE - child made de 
325 F. Supp.2d 565 X minimus progress on old IEP and new 
(D. Md. 2004). IEP was identical. 
Kenton City Sch. 
Dist. v. Hunt, 384 Appropriate education is "not 
F.3d 269, 281 (6th 
X 
synonymous with best possible 
Cir. 2004), rehearing education" nor is it an education that 
denied, 2004 U.S. enables a child to achieve his or her 
App. LEXIS 24498 full potential. 
_(_U.S. App. 2004}. 
Bucks County Dept, A somewhat broader interpretation of 
of MHR v. Penn the term "appropriate" determining 
379 F.3d 61 X that Courts can remedy if IEP is found 
(3'd circuit 2004). insufficient 
Deal v. Hamilton, 
392 F.3d 840, 861-62 "Requires IEP to confer meaningful 
(6th Cir. 2004), educational benefit gauged in relation 
rehearing denied, to child's potential." 
2005 U.S. App. 
X 
" ... there is a point at which the 
LEXIS 5631 (6th difference in outcomes between two 
Cir. 2004 ), cert. methods can be so great that provision 
denied, 2005 U.S. of lesser program could amount to 
LEXIS 7325 (U.S. denial ofF APE." 
2005). 
Fayette County Bd. Some educational benefit conferred 
ofEduc. v. M.R.D., 
X with student progressing academically 158 S.W.3d 195, 202 
(Ky. 2005). is in receipt ofF APE. 
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00 ..... ..... Q u 
Brown v. 
Bartholomew 
Consol. Sch. Corp., 
X 
IEP reasonably calculated to provide 
2005 WL552194 at educational benefit. 




" ... educational strategy and CV-765S, 2005 WL 
711886 at *10 X methodology requiring deference to 
(W.D.N.Y. March expertise of administrative offices." 
28, 2005). 
At a minimum provide personalized 
Reid ex re. Reid v. instruction with sufficient support to 
District of Columbia, permit child to benefit educationally 
401 F.3d 516, 519 X from that instruction .. .if in regular 
(D.D.C. 2005). class ... reasonably calculated to 
enable child to achieve passing marks 
and advance from grade to grade. 
Marissa F. v. IEP sufficient as provided minimal 
William Penn. Sch. education benefit. "[I]t is not the 
Dist., No. Civ.A.04-
X 
court's place to substitute its idea of 
286,2005 WL good educational policy for ideas and 
2304738 at *4 (E.D. techniques adopted by Pennsylvania 
Pa. Sept. 20, 2005). educators." 
